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Abstract. We report on a case study in which the model checker Up-
paal is used to formally model parts of Zeroconf, a protocol for dynamic
configuration of IPv4 link-local addresses that has been defined in RFC
3927 of the IETF. Our goal has been to construct a model that (a) is easy
to understand by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to the informal
text (for each transition in the model there should be a corresponding
piece of text in the RFC), and (c) may serve as a basis for formal verifica-
tion. Our modeling efforts revealed several errors (or at least ambiguities)
in the RFC that no one else spotted before. We present two proofs of the
mutual exclusion property for Zeroconf (for an arbitrary number of hosts
and IP addresses): a manual, operational proof, and a proof that com-
bines model checking with the application of a new abstraction relation
that is compositional with respect to committed locations. The model
checking problem has been solved using Uppaal, and the abstractions
have been checked either by hand or by using Uppaal-Tiga.
1 Introduction
Our society increasingly depends on the correct functioning of modern commu-
nication technology. Most prominent are (mobile) phones and Internet, but there
are also networks in modern cars, trains, and airplanes, and the new generation of
consumer electronics allows all sorts of devices to communicate with each other.
? Research supported by PROGRESS project TES4199, Verification of Hard
and Softly Timed Systems (HaaST), the European Community Project
IST-2001-35304 Advanced Methods for Timed Systems (AMETIST),
http://ametist.cs.utwente.nl, the DFG/NWO bilateral cooperation
project Validation of Stochastic Systems (VOSS2), and NWO/GBE
project 612.000.103 Fault-tolerant Real-time Algorithms Analyzed Incre-
mentally (FRAAI). A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [21].
All the Uppaal models described in this paper are available on-line at
http://www.cs.ru.nl/ita/publications/papers/fvaan/zeroconf/.
2The most important and most often used protocols that describe the operation
of these networks are standardized. Examples of this are the Internet proto-
col (TCP/IP), FireWire/iLink (IEEE 1394), HAVi, WAP, CAN and BlueTooth.
Due to a combination of factors, the complexity of these protocol standards is
often very high: rapid changes in the capabilities of the underlying hardware,
the fact that often many (industrial) parties are involved in standardization,
each with its own interests, and market demands to extend the functionality of
the protocol. Since these standards serve as a guide to implementors from many
different companies, with different backgrounds, it is vital that standards only
allow for one clear interpretation, are complete and ensure the required func-
tionality for each implementation. For most protocol standards this is clearly
not the case. In fact, it is surprising that protocols that are of such immense
importance to our society are typically written in informal language, with fre-
quent ambiguities, omissions and inconsistencies. They also fail to state what
properties are expected of a network running the protocol, and what it means
for an implementation to conform to a standard.
By now there is ample evidence that formal (mathematical) techniques and
tools may help to improve the quality of protocol standards. Numerous publi-
cations describe the formal modeling and analysis of critical parts of protocols,
and via these case studies many previously undetected bugs have been detected
(see e.g. [18, 11, 19, 28, 34, 23, 17, 35]). In most cases, these studies were carried
out after completion of the standard, and involved guessing to fill in holes and
resolve ambiguities. An exception is the work by Romijn et al., who aim at ap-
plying formal methods already during the standard development process. Their
efforts have resulted, for instance, in the discovery and correction of many errors,
omissions and inconsistencies, as well as the addition of correctness properties,
in the IEEE 1394.1 FireWire Net Update standard [33].
In order to avoid holes and ambiguities in standards, the obvious way to go
is to describe critical parts using formal specification languages, similar to the
way in which diagrams are used to specify the electrical circuits and mechanical
parts. There have been joint attempts of academia and industry to arrive at
formal description languages for protocols. The most notable attempts at this
have been the LOTOS and SDL standardization efforts. However — to the best
of our knowledge — these languages have thus far not been used in the author-
itative part of protocol standards. Some protocol standard have extended finite
state machines (EFSMs) inside, but these are mostly illustrative, not completely
formal, and sometimes contain mistakes.3 Bruns and Staskauskas [11] used (a
well-defined subset of) C to describe the SONET Automatic Protection Switch-
ing (APS) protocol and report that developers found their C description easy to
understand and superior to that which appeared in the APS standard. However,
the lack of abstraction mechanisms is an obvious drawback of C.
The relationships between an (abstract) formal model of a protocol and the
corresponding informal standard are typically obscure. As pointed out in [10],
3 See, for instance, http://www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/Press/firewire.html.
3“Current research seems to take the construction of verification models
more or less for granted, although their development typically requires
a coordinated integration of the experience, intuition and creativity of
verification and domain experts. There is a great need for systematic
methods for the construction of verification models to move on, and leave
the current stage that can be characterized as that of model hacking.
The ad-hoc construction of verification models obscures the relationship
between models and the systems that they represent, and undermines
the reliability and relevance of the verification results that are obtained.”
As a step towards the development of a systematic method, we report in this
paper on the systematic construction of a verification model of a recent protocol
standard. More specifically, we describe the use of the Uppaal model checker
to model and analyze critical parts of Zeroconf, a protocol for dynamic config-
uration of IPv4 link-local addresses. Our goal has been to construct a model
that (a) is easy to understand by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to the
informal text (for each transition in the model there is a corresponding piece of
text in the standard), and (c) may serve as a basis for formal verification.
Uppaal [5, 4] is an integrated tool environment for specification, validation and
verification of real time systems modeled as networks of timed automata [2].
The tool is available for free for non-profit applications at www.uppaal.com. The
language for the new version Uppaal 4.0 features a subset of the C program-
ming language, a graphical user interface for specifying networks of EFSMs,
and timed automata syntax for specifying timing constraints. Due to these ex-
tensions, Uppaal is able to support modeling and analysis of critical parts of
protocol specifications:
1. The graphical syntax for EFSMs and the C-like syntax are easy to under-
stand for protocol designers and implementers, and very close to notations
they use anyway.
2. Uppaal allows one to specify timing constraints between events, which is
quite important in many protocol specifications.
3. The Uppaal language does have formal semantics and the transitions pro-
vide a simple abstraction mechanism for the C-like syntax: the semantics of
a program is defined in terms of its effect on the observable state variables.
4. The Uppaal toolset supports simulation and model checking.
Recently, efficient on-line algorithms for solving reachability and safety games
based on timed game automata have been put forward [12] and made available
within the tool Uppaal-Tiga. In collaboration with Thomas Chatain, Alexan-
dre David and Kim Larsen, we have used Uppaal-Tiga to automatically check
the correctness of one of our abstractions [13].
Zeroconf [16] is a protocol for dynamic configuration of IPv4 link-local addresses
that has been defined by the IETF Network Working Group in RFC 3927 [15].
There are many situations in which one would like to use the Internet Protocol
4for local communication, for instance in the setting of in home digital networks
or to establish communication between laptops. For these type of applications
it is desirable to have a plug-and-play network in which new hosts automati-
cally configure an IPv4 address, without using external configuration servers,
like DHCP and DNS, or requiring users to set up each computer by hand. The
Zeroconf protocol has been proposed to achieve exactly this. It describes how a
host may automatically configure an interface with an IPv4 address within the
169.254/16 prefix that is valid for communication with other devices connected
to the same physical (or logical) link. The most widely adopted Zeroconf imple-
mentation is Bonjour from Apple Computer4, but several other implementations
are available.5
Contribution The contribution of this paper is, first of all, a formal model of
(a critical part of) Zeroconf — a protocol with clear practical relevance — that
is easy to understand, faithful to the RFC, and with an extensive discussion of
the relationship between the model and the RFC. Our modeling efforts revealed
several errors (or at least ambiguities) in the RFC that no one else spotted
before. We present two proofs of the mutual exclusion property for Zeroconf for
an arbitrary number of hosts and IP addresses: a manual, operational proof, and
a proof that combines model checking with the application of a new abstraction
relation that is compositional with respect to committed locations. The model
checking problem has been solved using Uppaal, and the abstractions have been
checked either by hand or by using Uppaal-Tiga.
Related Work Zeroconf involves a number of probabilistic aspects that are not
incorporated in our Uppaal model: hosts select IP-addresses randomly, using a
pseudo-random number generator, and at some point during the protocol they
wait for a random amount of time selected uniformly from an interval. The
probabilistic behavior of Zeroconf has been studied in [9, 26]. The primary goal
of [9] was to investigate the trade off between reliability and effectiveness of the
protocol using a stochastic cost model. The model of [9], which only involves
a single host, is quite appropriate in capturing the probabilistic behavior of IP
address configuration and conflict handling, but the analysis takes place at a
level that is much more abstract than the RFC. Based on an earlier version of
the present paper, a more detailed model has been presented in [26] using the
probabilistic model checker PRISM [27]. The model checking results reported
in [26] are quite interesting, but the precise relationship between the model
and the RFC is unclear (for instance, in the model of [26] address defense only
occurs before a host is using an IP address). Our motivation for using Uppaal
instead of PRISM was that the input language of PRISM is too primitive for
our purposes (no GUI, just a few datatypes, no support of C-like syntax,..). A
toolset that combines the functionality of Uppaal and PRISM would be ideal for
dealing with the Zeroconf protocol. The compositional step simulation relations
4 See http://developer.apple.com/networking/bonjour/.
5 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeroconf.
5between timed transition systems that we use to establish the correctness of our
abstractions are inspired by the timed ready simulations from [25], and use the
framework decribed in [6].
Paper outline The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we explain
the protocol and our Uppaal model. Section 3 presents a manual correctness
proof of the protocol. Section 4 shows how arbitrary instances of our model can
be analyzed fully automatically after applying a series of abstractions. Finally,
Section 5 presents some conclusions and directions for future research.
2 Modeling the Zeroconf Protocol
In this section, we describe our Uppaal model of the Zeroconf protocol, and
the relationship between our model and RFC 3927 [15], the official protocol
standard.
A Zeroconf network is composed of a set of hosts on the same link. Hosts in
the network can be devices that are present at home, office, embedded systems
“plugged together” as in an automobile, or the laptops of some friends who
are writing a joint paper and want to share a file. The goal of Zeroconf is to
enable networking in the absence of configuration and administration services.
The core of RFC 3927 [15] concerns the dynamic configuration of IPv4 link-local
addresses, and this is the part on which we focus in this paper.
The basic idea of Zeroconf is trivial and easy to explain. A host that wants
to configure a new IP link-local address randomly selects an address from a
specified range and then broadcasts a few identical messages to the other hosts,
seperated by some delay, asking whether someone is already using the address.
If one of the other hosts indicates that it is using the other address, the host
starts all over again. Otherwise, it will start using the address after waiting a
certain amount of time. One may view Zeroconf as a distributed mutual exclusion
algorithm in which the resources are IP addresses. A goal of Zeroconf is to
prevent that two different hosts are using the same IP address. The underlying
algorithm used in Zeroconf is similar to Fisher’s mutual exclusion algorithm [1,
30] and makes essential use of timing. However, whereas Fischer’s algorithm uses
a shared variable for communication between processes, Zeroconf uses broadcast
communication. Within Zeroconf, hosts do not aim at acquiring access to a
specific critical section (IP address); it is enough to obtain access to one of the
65024 available critical sections (IP addresses).
2.1 Fixing the Topology
RFC 3927 assumes a set of hosts. This set is not fixed and host may join and
leave while the protocol is running. Since Uppaal does not support dynamic
process creation, we assume a fixed positive number of k hosts. It may take
arbitrary long before a host becomes active in the protocol and one may argue
that in this way creation of new hosts is being captured. A phenomenon that
6may occur in practice, but which we have not modeled here, is that distinct
Zeroconf networks are joined. We also do not model host failure or termination
although it would be easy to add this.6
The behavior of a host is modeled by three timed automata that run con-
currently: Config, InputHandler and Regular. Automaton Config describes the
configuration of a new IP address, InputHandler takes care of the incoming mes-
sages, and Regular abstractly models the activity of all the other processes run-
ning on the host. The three automata are parametrized by the unique process
identifier (PID) of the host they belong to. We assume a finite set of k PIDs,
represented in Uppaal by a scalar type:
typedef scalar[k] PIDtype;
Within Uppaal, scalar[k] denotes the set {0, . . . , k−1}, but on scalar types only
a limited number of operations is permitted: assignment and identity testing. As
a consequence, a scalar type is unordered and fully symmetric: the behavior
of a model is invariant under arbitrary permutations of the elements of a scalar
type [24, 22]. By using a scalar type rather than a subrange type, we specify that
within our model all the PIDs (and therefore all the hosts) play a fully symmetric
role. This makes it possible to exploit this symmetry during exploration of the
state space.
2.2 The Underlying Network
RFC 3927 states the following assumption about the underlying network [page
4, section 1.3]:
“This specification applies to all IEEE 802 Local Area Networks (LANs)
[802], including Ethernet [802.3], Token-Ring [802.5] and IEEE 802.11
wireless LANs [802.11], as well as to other link-layer technologies that
operate at data rates of at least 1 Mbps, have a round-trip latency of at
most one second, and support ARP [RFC826].”
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [32] is a widely used method for con-
verting protocol addresses (e.g., IP addresses) to local network (“hardware”)
addresses (e.g., Ethernet addresses). It takes care of dynamic distribution of the
information needed to build tables to translate protocol addresses to hardware
addresses. Within Zeroconf, all messages are ARP packets.
We assume a finite set of hardware addresses, represented abstractly by a
scalar type:
typedef scalar[l] HAtype;
Here l denotes the number of hardware addresses. As explained above, the advantage of
using a scalar type is that we may benefit from symmetry reduction during verification.
However, since we cannot refer explicitly to elements from a scalar type, we need a
6 Notationally it would be somewhat cumbersome as Uppaal still lacks a notion of
hierarchical state.
7trick to denote the all zeroes hardware address, which is referred to by the protocol: we
introduce a state variable nil of type HAtype, whose value remains unchanged during
any run of the system, and let the value of nil represent the all zeroes hardware
address. We assume l > k, so that we can assign to each host a unique nonzero
hardware address.
The goal of Zeroconf is to configure a link-local IP address. Altogether there are
216 − 2× 256 = 65024 link-local addresses:
The IPv4 prefix 169.254/16 is registered with the IANA for this purpose. The
first 256 and last 256 addresses in the 169.254/16 prefix are reserved for future
use and MUST NOT be selected by a host using this dynamic configuration
mechanism.”
The total number of link-local addresses occurs as a parameter m in our model. The only
IP addresses used by Zeroconf are link-local addresses and the all zeroes IP address
0.0.0.0, which serves as a special ‘unknown’ or ‘undefined’ value in the protocol. We
represent the set of used IP addresses abstractly by a scalar type:
typedef scalar[m+1] IPtype;
Again, we need a trick to refer to a specific element of this scalar type within
our model: state variable zero of type IPtype, whose value remains unchanged
during any run of the system, denotes the all zeroes IP address.
For our model, the relevant information in an ARP packet consists of (1) a
sender hardware address, (2) a sender IP address, (3) a target IP address, and
(4) the packet type, which can be either “request” or “reply”. Hence, an ARP
packet can be defined as a Uppaal type as follows:
typedef struct{
HAtype senderHA; // sender hardware address
IPtype senderIP; // sender IP address
IPtype targetIP; // target IP address
bool request; // is the packet a Request or a Reply
}ARP_packet;
Here we use the convention that the request field is true for ARP requests and
false for ARP replies.
In Zeroconf, all ARP packets are broadcast [page 13, section 2.5]:
“All ARP packets (*replies* as well as requests) that contain a Link- Lo-
cal ’sender IP address’ MUST be sent using link-layer broadcast instead
of link-layer unicast. This aids timely detection of duplicate addresses.”
A host that is looking for the hardware address of another host with IP address
x, broadcasts an ARP request packet with the target IP address set to x. A
host with IP address x will then return an ARP reply packet with the sender
hardware address set to its local network address.
We model the underlying network as a set of n identical Network automata.
Each of these automata takes care of handling a single ARP request at a time,
and is parametrized by an element of the scalar type:
typedef scalar[n] Networktype;
8The main reason for having n automata, rather than just one, is that this allows
us to model round-trip latencies in Uppaal: each network automaton has its
own clock to keep track of timing. Fig. 1 schematically illustrates the operation
of a Network automaton. After a request from a host comes in (send req), this
send_req
Host
receive_msg
receive_msg
send_answer
Host
Network
Fig. 1. Interaction between Network automaton and hosts.
is broadcast to all hosts (receive msg). In case there is an answer (this may be
a reply or a request packet) this is transferred from the host to the network
automaton using a receive msg action, and broadcast to all other hosts via sub-
sequent receive msg actions. All these interactions take place within 1 second.
After completing its task, a Network automaton returns to its initial location,
ready to handle a new request.
To simplify our model, we assume that hosts handle incoming ARP requests
in zero time, i.e., we adopt the synchrony hypothesis that is well-known from
synchronous programming [8]. A desktop computer can realistically answer an
ARP in 100µs. A device like a SitePlayer could take up to 10ms. Neither have
a significant impact on achieving a round-trip delay under 1s. By taking the
conceptual view that the 1s which Network may use to do its work includes the
time needed by a host to generate a reply, we avoid cumbersome modeling of
input buffers at each host.
Before explaining our model of the Network automaton in detail, in Sec-
tion 2.5, we now turn our attention to the core part of RFC 3927, which concerns
address configuration.
2.3 Address Configuration
Each host in the system maintains a hardware address and an IP address:
HAtype HA[PIDtype];
IPtype IP[PIDtype];
9A special initialization process assigns to each host a unique, nonzero hardware
address (which remains fixed for the rest of the execution) and the initial all
zeroes IP address (which will change as a result of address configuration).
Fig. 2 displays the automaton Config[pid], which specifies how host pid
configures a new IP address. The host starts in location INIT, where it stays
PRE_CLAIM
x<=ANNOUNCE_WAIT
WAIT
x<=PROBE_WAIT
COLLISION
x<=RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL
PROBE
x <= PROBE_MAX
INIT
CLAIMED
counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM imply
x<=ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
reset[pid]?
UseIP[pid]:=false,
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
counter==PROBE_NUM
urg!
x:=0x:=PROBE_MAX,counter:=0
ConflictNum >= MAX_CONFLICTS &&
x==RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
counter<PROBE_NUM &&
x>=PROBE_MIN
send_req!
packet.senderHA:=HA[pid],
packet.senderIP:=zero,
packet.targetIP:=IP[pid],
packet.request:=true,
counter++,
x:=0
guess:IPtype
guess!=zero
IP[pid]:=guess,
x:=0
counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM &&
x== ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
send_req!
packet.senderHA:=HA[pid],
packet.senderIP:=IP[pid],
packet.targetIP:=IP[pid],
packet.request:=true,
counter++,
x:=0,
UseIP[pid]:=true
x==ANNOUNCE_WAIT
ConflictNum:=0,
x:=ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL,
counter:=0
ConflictNum < MAX_CONFLICTS
urg!
ConflictNum++
Fig. 2. Automaton Config[pid].
until it has selected an IP address. According to the RFC [page 9, section 2.1]:
“When a host wishes to configure an IPv4 Link-Local address, it selects
an address using a pseudo-random number generator with a uniform
distribution in the range from 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 inclusive.”
A transition from location INIT to location WAIT takes place to mark that an
address has been selected. Via the Uppaal select statement guess:IPtype we
nondeterministically bind identifier guess to a value of type IPtype. This means
that there is an instance of the transition for each element of the type. The
transition is enabled if a value different from zero has been selected, that is, a
link-local address. In this way, we express that a link-local IP address is chosen
nondeterministically. The selected address is stored in state variable IP[pid].
The RFC continues [page 11, section 2.2.1]:
“When ready to begin probing, the host should then wait for a random
time interval selected uniformly in the range zero to PROBE WAIT sec-
onds, and should then send PROBE NUM probe packets, each of these
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probe packets spaced randomly, PROBE MIN to PROBE MAX seconds
apart.”
The waiting period is modeled by resetting a local clock x upon entering location
WAIT and by bounding the time the host may stay in WAIT with an invariant x <=
PROBE WAIT. At any point the host may move to location PROBE, where it starts
sending “probes”. The notion of an ARP Probe is specified in the RFC as follows:
“A host probes to see if an address is already in use by broadcasting an
ARP Request for the desired address. The client MUST fill in the ‘sender
hardware address’ field of the ARP Request with the hardware address
of the interface through which it is sending the packet. The ‘sender IP
address’ field MUST be set to all zeroes, to avoid polluting ARP caches
in other hosts on the same link in the case where the address turns out
to be already in use by another host. The ‘target hardware address’ field
is ignored and SHOULD be set to all zeroes. The ‘target IP address’ field
MUST be set to the address being probed. An ARP Request constructed
this way with an all-zero ‘sender IP address’ is referred to as an ”ARP
Probe”.”
Sending ARP Probes is modeled via actions send req! that synchronize with the
network. The actual packet is communicated via a global shared variable packet
of type ARP packet. In Uppaal the assignments in an output (!) transition are
executed before the assignments in a synchronizing input (?) transition, and
this allows us to assign a value to packet in a send req! transition, which is then
picked up by a corresponding send req? transition by a Network automaton. The
lower and upper bounds of the probe interval are expressed in our model with a
guard x >= PROBE MIN on the sending transition and an invariant x <= PROBE MAX
on location PROBE, respectively. By setting x to PROBE MAX in the transition from
WAIT to PROBE, we express that the first probe is sent immediately. A local vari-
able counter is used to record the number of probes that have been sent. After
the probing phase is completed, the automaton immediately jumps to location
PRE CLAIM. The urgent broadcast channel urg ensures that this transition is taken
as soon as it is enabled. As the reader can check, the translation from the RFC
description of the probing phase to our model is straightforward.
According to the RFC:
“If, by ANNOUNCE WAIT seconds after the transmission of the last
ARP Probe no conflicting ARP Reply or ARP Probe has been received,
then the host has successfully claimed the desired IPv4 Link-Local ad-
dress.”
Clock x is used to ensure that exactly ANNOUNCE WAIT time units are spent in loca-
tion PRE CLAIM. A transition from location PRE CLAIM to location CLAIM indicates
that the host has successfully claimed an address.
In our model, automaton InputHandler[pid] (which will be explained in Sec-
tion 2.4) takes care of handling incoming messages. If InputHandler[pid] decides
that, due to some conflict, a new address must be configured, it performs an
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action reset[pid]!. This triggers a reset[pid]? transition to location COLLISION
in Config[pid]. As part of this transition, IP[pid] is set to zero and clock x is
reset. According to the RFC:
“A host should maintain a counter of the number of address conflicts it
has experienced in the process of trying to acquire an address, and if the
number of conflicts exceeds MAX CONFLICTS then the host MUST
limit the rate at which it probes for new addresses to no more than one
new address per RATE LIMIT INTERVAL. This is to prevent catas-
trophic ARP storms in pathological failure cases, such as a rogue host
that answers all ARP Probes, causing legitimate hosts to go into an
infinite loop attempting to select a usable address.”
A counter ConflictNum is used in our model to record the number of conflicts that
have occurred during the process of acquiring an IP address. Depending on the
value of ConflictNum, the automaton returns to location INIT immediately or first
waits for RATE LIMIT INTERVAL time units. Again, the correspondence between the
RFC text and our Uppaal model is straightforward.
In location CLAIMED the host announces the new address that it has just
claimed [page 12, section 2.4]:
“Having probed to determine a unique address to use, the host MUST
then announce its claimed address by broadcasting ANNOUNCE NUM
ARP announcements, spaced ANNOUNCE INTERVAL seconds apart.
An ARP announcement is identical to the ARP Probe described above,
except that now the sender and target IP addresses are both set to the
host’s newly selected IPv4 address. The purpose of these ARP announce-
ments is to make sure that other hosts on the link do not have stale ARP
cache entries left over from some other host that may previously have
been using the same address.”
The notion of an ARP Announcement is specified in the RFC as follows:
“In this document, the term ”ARP Announcement” is used to refer to
an ARP Request packet, broadcast on the local link, identical to the
ARP Probe described above, except that both the sender and target IP
address fields contain the IP address being announced.”
The RFC does not specify upper and lower bounds on the time that may elapse
between sending the last ARP Probe and sending the first ARP Announcement.
However, according to the protocol designers upper and lower bound both equal
ANNOUNCE WAIT [14]. Also, the RFC does not specify whether a host may imme-
diately start using a newly claimed address (in parallel with sending the ARP
Announcements), or whether it should first send out all announcements. Accord-
ing to the designers, a host should send the first ARP Announcement, and then
it can immediately start using the address [14]. So the second announcement
goes out ANNOUNCE INTERVAL seconds later, but other traffic does not need to be
held up waiting for that. Finally, the RFC does not specify the tolerance that
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is permitted on the timing of ARP Announcements. Since no physical device
can consistently send messages spaced exactly ANNOUNCE INTERVAL seconds apart,
strictly speaking it is impossible for an implementation to conform to the RFC.
According to the designers, the RFC does not specify accuracy requirements,
partly because the protocol is robust to a wide range of variations, so it does
not matter [14]. We decided to follow the RFC and not specify accuracy re-
quirements, but in order to use our model for automatic generation of tests, for
instance using the Uppaal-Tron toolset [29], one will have to modify our model
at this point.
With this additional information, the modeling of the announcement phase
in Uppaal is straightforward and analogous to that of the probing phase. After
sending the first announcement, Boolean variable UseIP[pid] is set to true. This
enables automaton Regular[pid], displayed in Fig. 3, to start sending out regular
ARP requests packets with the senderIP field set to IP[pid] and the targetIP
field set to an arbitrary link-local address. However, even when a host is using
an IP address a conflict may arise at any time. When this happens automaton
Config[pid] returns to its initial location and sets UseIP[pid] to false again.
INIT
address:IPtype
UseIP[pid] && address!=zero
send_req!
packet.senderHA:=HA[pid],
packet.senderIP:=IP[pid],
packet.targetIP:=address,
packet.request:=true
Fig. 3. Automation Regular[pid].
2.4 The Input Handler
Automaton InputHandler[pid] receives incoming ARP packets and decides what
to do with them. Input handling is described at various places in RFC 3937,
which makes it nontrivial to determine the reaction to an arbitrary ARP packet,
also because Zeroconf runs on top of the ARP protocol, which it sometimes
follows but sometimes overrules. Automaton InputHandler[pid] is displayed in
Fig. 4. The automaton starts with a transition to initialize its local variables:
clock y is set to a large value, and packet variable answer is set to the undefined
value. When a new packet arrives, that is, when a receive msg[j][pid]? transi-
tion occurs, the automaton calls a function ihandler, which does the real work.
The definition of ihandler is listed in Fig. 5. Function ihandler has a parameter
defend which may be either false or true. This parameter indicates that a host
will defend its IP address in case of a conflicting ARP request, and may be true
only if there has been no other conflict during the last DEFEND INTERVAL time
units. Clock y is used to measure the time since the last conflict. Altogether, the
input handler needs to distinguish 9 scenarios:
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BUSY
INIT IDLE
answer.senderIP==zero
&& do_reset
reset[pid]!
do_reset:=false
answer.senderIP!=zero
send_answer[network]!
packet:=answer,
initialize(answer)
answer.senderIP==zero
&& !do_reset
j:Networktype
receive_msg[j][pid]?
ihandler(false),
network:=j
y:=DEFEND_INTERVAL+1,
initialize(answer) j:Networktype
y>DEFEND_INTERVAL
receive_msg[j][pid]?
ihandler(true),
network:=j
Fig. 4. Automaton InputHandler[pid].
Scenario A. If a packet comes in when a host has not yet selected an IP address
it should be ignored. This scenario is not listed explicitly in the RFC but should
be obvious.
Scenario B. Incoming packets sent by the host itself can be ignored. Also this
scenario is implicit in the RFC.
Scenario C. A conflict may arise when another host sends a packet with the
senderIP field set to IP[pid]. This occurs in Scenario C, which is described on
[page 11, section 2.2.1]:
“If during this period, from the beginning of the probing process until
ANNOUNCE WAIT seconds after the last probe packet is sent, the host
receives any ARP packet (Request *or* Reply) on the interface where
the probe is being performed where the packet’s ‘sender IP address’ is
the address being probed for, then the host MUST treat this address as
being in use by some other host, and MUST select a new pseudo-random
address and repeat the process.”
Scenarios D and E. In the previous scenario, UseIP[pid]==false. The case with
UseIP[pid]==true is also described in the RFC [page 12, section 2.5]:
“Address conflict detection is not limited to the address selection phase,
when a host is sending ARP Probes. Address conflict detection is an
ongoing process that is in effect for as long as a host is using an IPv4
Link-Local address. At any time, if a host receives an ARP packet (re-
quest *or* reply) on an interface where the ‘sender IP address’ is the IP
address the host has configured for that interface, but the ‘sender hard-
ware address’ does not match the hardware address of that interface,
then this is a conflicting ARP packet, indicating an address conflict.
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void ihandler(bool defend)
{
if (IP[pid]==zero) // Scenario A: I have not selected an IP address
;
else if (packet.senderHA==HA[pid]) // Scenario B: I have sent the packet myself
;
else if (packet.senderIP==IP[pid]) //There is a conflict: somebody else is using my address!
{
if (not UseIP[pid]) // Scenario C: select a new address
do_reset:=true;
else if (defend) // Scenario D: I am going to defend my address
{
answer.senderHA:=HA[pid];
answer.senderIP:=IP[pid];
answer.targetIP:=IP[pid];
answer.request:=true;
y:=0;
}
else // Scenario E: I will not defend my address
do_reset:=true;
}
else if (not UseIP[pid])
{
if (packet.targetIP==IP[pid] && packet.request && packet.senderIP==zero) // Scenario F: conflicting probe
do_reset:=true;
else //Scenario G: Packet is not conflicting with IP address that I want to use
;
}
else // Packet is not conflicting with IP address that I am using
{
if (packet.targetIP==IP[pid] && packet.request) // Scenario H: answer regular ARP request
{
answer.senderHA:=HA[pid];
answer.senderIP:=IP[pid];
answer.targetIP:=packet.senderIP;
answer.request:=false;
}
else // Scenario I: no reply message required
;
}
}
Fig. 5. Function ihandler.
A host MUST respond to a conflicting ARP packet as described in either
(a) or (b) below:
(a) Upon receiving a conflicting ARP packet, a host MAY elect to im-
mediately configure a new IPv4 Link-Local address as described above,
or
(b) If a host currently has active TCP connections or other reasons to
prefer to keep the same IPv4 address, and it has not seen any other
conflicting ARP packets within the last DEFEND INTERVAL seconds,
then it MAY elect to attempt to defend its address by recording the time
that the conflicting ARP packet was received, and then broadcasting one
single ARP Announcement, giving its own IP and hardware addresses
as the sender addresses of the ARP. Having done this, the host can then
continue to use the address normally without any further special action.
However, if this is not the first conflicting ARP packet the host has seen,
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and the time recorded for the previous conflicting ARP packet is recent,
within DEFEND INTERVAL seconds, then the host MUST immediately
cease using this address and configure a new IPv4 Link-Local address
as described above. This is necessary to ensure that two hosts do not
get stuck in an endless loop with both hosts trying to defend the same
address.
A host MUST respond to conflicting ARP packets as described in either
(a) or (b) above. A host MUST NOT ignore conflicting ARP packets.”
Case (a) corresponds to our scenario E. This scenario occurs when the topmost
receive msg? transition in the automaton is taken, which sets defend to false,
Case (b) corresponds to scenario D.
The interpretation of the sentence “and it has not seen any other conflicting
ARP packets within the last DEFEND INTERVAL seconds” in the previous
quotation from the RFC is not entirely clear. Is a host allowed to defend its
address if there has been a recent conflict concerning a different address (but no
previous conflict concerning the current address)? Strictly speaking, the host has
seen a conflicting packet and it may not defend. However, the conflict concerned
a different address, and the motivation for recording the time since the last
conflict has been to rule out a scenario in which two hosts get stuck in an
endless loop trying to defend the same address. Thus one could also argue that
in this situation a host may defend its address. To model this interpretation, one
has to add an assignment y := DEFEND INTERVAL+1 to the reset transition of the
input handler.
Scenarios F and G. The RFC specifies one more conflict scenario [page 11,
section 2.2.1]:
“In addition, if during this period [from the beginning of the probing
process until ANNOUNCE WAIT seconds after the last probe packet
is sent] the host receives any ARP Probe where the packet’s ‘target
IP address’ is the address being probed for, and the packet’s ‘sender
hardware address’ is not the hardware address of the interface the host
is attempting to configure, then the host MUST similarly treat this as
an address conflict and select a new address as above. This can occur
if two (or more) hosts attempt to configure the same IPv4 Link-Local
address at the same time.”
In the ihandler code, this corresponds to scenario F. Scenario G, which is implicit
in the RFC, occurs when the incoming packet is not conflicting and the host is
not yet using an IP address. In this case the incoming packet is ignored.
Scenario H and I. The Address Resolution Protocol (RFC 826) [32] specifies
that if a host receives an ARP request packet, it should return an ARP reply
packet if it uses an IP address that equals the target protocol address of this
request. In the reply packet the hardware and protocol field should be swapped,
putting the local hardware and protocol addresses in the sender fields. Zeroconf
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(RFC 3927) is not explicit about conformance to RFC 826, but in our model
we take the view that once a host is using an IP address, it answers regular
ARP requests in agreement with RFC 826 except when (a) the request has been
broadcast by the host itself, or (b) there is a conflict. This is scenario H in our
model. The final Scenario I occurs when the incoming packet is not conflicting
with the IP address that the host is using, and no reply packet needs to be sent.
2.5 The Network Automaton
As explained in Section 2.2, we model the underlying network as a set of n
identical Network automata. For index j, the automaton Network[j] is shown in
Fig. 6. Initially the automaton is in its IDLE location. As soon as it receives a
BUSY
z<=1
IDLE
a_buffer.senderIP==zero
send_answer[j]?
a_buffer:=packet,
set(answer)
a:PIDtype
answer[a]==true
receive_msg[j][a]!
answer[a]:=false,
packet:=a_buffer
a:PIDtype
send[a]==true
receive_msg[j][a]!
send[a]:=false,
packet:=s_buffer
forall (a:PIDtype) !send[a] && !answer[a]
urg!
initialize(s_buffer),
initialize(a_buffer)
send_req?
s_buffer:=packet,
set(send),
z:=0
Fig. 6. Automaton Network[j].
packet from a host via send req?, it jumps to location BUSY. A local clock z is
set to zero and an invariant z ≤ 1 ensures that within 1 second the network
broadcasts the packet (and the answer if there is one) to all hosts. There is
no lower bound on message delivery time. We assume that there is at most
one host that wants to answer any given request, and that an answer does
not induce subsequent answers. It is possible to handle multiple and successive
answers, but this requires additional state variables and more complicated data
structures. Our Network automaton maintains two local variables for storing
packets: s buffer stores the packet that was sent by the host and a buffer stores
an answer when it arrives. In addition, Network maintains Boolean arrays send
and answer to record to which hosts packets still need to be delivered. The
function set is used to set all Booleans of a Boolean array to true. Using the
Uppaal select statement on the receive msg[j][a]! transitions, the automaton
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nondeterministically selects in which order packets are delivered to the different
hosts. The upper transition labeled with send answer[j]? occurs when a host
returns an answer upon receipt of a request, as explained in Subsection 2.4.
The lower transition labeled with receive msg[j][a]! is enabled as soon as there
is an answer packet in answer buffer. The network returns to its IDLE location
and resets its buffers to some initial values, as soon as all messages have been
delivered.
2.6 Dimensioning the Complete Model
The RFC [page 25, section 9] specifies the following values for the different timing
constants. These definitions are copied almost verbatim in the declaration section
of our Uppaal model.
"PROBE_WAIT 1 second (initial random delay)
PROBE_NUM 3 (number of probe packets)
PROBE_MIN 1 second (minimum delay till repeated probe)
PROBE_MAX 2 seconds (maximum delay till repeated probe)
ANNOUNCE_WAIT 2 seconds (delay before announcing)
ANNOUNCE_NUM 2 (number of announcement packets)
ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL 2 seconds (time between announcement packets)
MAX_CONFLICTS 10 (max conflicts before rate limiting)
RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL 60 seconds (delay between successive attempts)
DEFEND_INTERVAL 10 seconds (minimum interval between defensive ARPs)."
In general, a Zeroconf network has 65024 IP addresses available and it is
suitable for up to 1300 hosts [15]. These values are too big for automatic verifi-
cation and with 3 hosts and 65024 IP addresses even the simulator runs out of
memory.
A next issue regarding the dimensioning of the model is the number n of
Network automata, i.e., the maximal number of ARP packets that may be in
transit at any given point. In our model, a host may select an IP address, send
a probe, and return to the initial location via a reset in zero time. In fact, this
behavior may be repeated MAX CONFLICTS times in a row in zero time. Once a
host is using an IP address, the number of messages in transit may increase even
further (in fact unboundedly) since there is no lower bound on the time between
successive ARP requests. Uppaal forces us to bound the number of Network
automata to some small number n.
3 Manual Verification
The model described in Section 2 is very close to the RFC definition of the
protocol. However, the model is too big for Uppaal to do a complete state
space exploration for nontrivial instances without some drastic abstractions.
The RFC does not specify what properties the protocol must satisfy. However,
it is clear that at least the following two correctness properties are desirable:7
7 Mutual exclusion will not hold in an extension of our model in which Zeroconf
networks can be merged. In such an extension the specification should be weakened:
mutual exclusion may be violated after a join, but as soon as the violation is detected
mutual exclusion will be restored within a specified amount of time, provided no
further joins occur.
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1. Mutual exclusion, i.e., two hosts may not use the same IP address. This can
be specified in Uppaal as follows:
ME = A[] forall (i: PIDtype) forall (j: PIDtype)
(UseIP[i] && UseIP[j] && IP[i]==IP[j]) imply i==j
2. Absence of deadlock, i.e, in each reachable state a transition is possible. In
Uppaal syntax:
DL = A[] not deadlock
Using the latest version of Uppaal (4.0), we only managed to establish ME and DL
for the instance with 2 hosts, 1 link-local IP address and 2 network automata.
Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that Zeroconf satisfies the mutual exclusion
and absence of deadlock properties. In the remainder of this section, we sketch
a manual proof of mutual exclusion. We claim that our model has no deadlocks
but do not present the (long and tedious) proof here.
Theorem 1. For each instance of our Zeroconf model (i.e., any number of hosts,
hardware addresses, IP addresses and network automata), the mutual exclusion
property ME holds.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose i and j are hosts with i != j, and suppose that in some
reachable state s, UseIP[i], UseIP[j] and IP[i]=IP[j]. We derive a contradiction.
Consider an execution α leading up to state s, i.e., a finite sequence of delay and
action transitions in the timed transition system semantics of the model leading
from the start state to s. Without loss of generality, we assume that host j
enters the critical section before (but possibly at the same time as) i. Observe
that before a host enters the “critical section” (where it may use its IP address)
it resides at least 4 time units in the “trying region” (where it has selected
an IP address but is not yet using it). Formally, the trying region of host i is
characterized by the predicate
Config(i).WAIT || Config(i).PROBE || Config(i).PRE_CLAIM ||
(Config(i).CLAIMED && !UseIP[i])
and the critical section is defined by
UseIP[i]
Moreover, exactly 2 time units before entering the critical section, a host sends
a (in fact, the last) probe packet.
Assume that host i is in its critical section from time t0 onwards, and is in
its trying region from time t1 to t0. Similarly, host j is in its critical section from
time u0 onwards, and is in its trying region from time u1 to u0. Let t be the
time at which host i sends its last probe and let u be the time at which this
probe is received by the input handler of host j. Then we have the following
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(in)equalities:
t0 ≥ u0
t0 ≥ t1 + 4
u0 ≥ u1 + 4
t = t0− 2
u ≥ t
t ≥ u− 1
We consider two cases:
1. See Figure 7. The probe arrives at host j before it enters the critical section.
u0
t0
t u
Host i Host j
u1
t1
Fig. 7. Probe arrives at j before it enters critical section.
Then j must be in its trying region since:
u ≥ t = t0− 2 ≥ u0− 2 > u0− 4 ≥ u1.
But this means that host j’s input handler, upon receipt of the conflicting
probe, will generate a reset (Scenario F) and drive Config(j) back to its
initial state, i.e, out of the trying region. Contradiction.
2. See Figure 8. The probe arrives at host j after it enters the critical section.
But this means that host j’s input handler, upon receipt of the probe, will
return a reply message (Scenario H). Since we assume a roundtrip delay of
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u0
t0
t1
t
Host i Host j
u1
u
t’
Fig. 8. Probe arrives at j after it enters critical section.
at most 1 time unit, this reply message will arrive at i at some time t′ with
t′ ≤ t + 1. At time t′ host i is still in its trying region since
t0 = t + 2 > t + 1 ≥ t′ ≥ t = t0− 2 > t0− 4 ≥ t1.
Hence, the input handler will generate a reset upon receipt of this reply
message (Scenario C) and drive Config(i) back to its initial state, i.e, out of
its trying region. Contradication. QED
Formalization/mechanization of the proof of Theorem 1, for instance in PVS
using the basic setup of [35], should be a routine exercise.
Inspection of the proof indicates that Zeroconf is extremely robust: the proto-
col has been designed to handle all kinds of error scenarios (loss of messages, fail-
ure of hosts, merge of networks) which do not occur within our idealized model.
Without these errors, it suffices (for mutual exclusion) to send out a single probe
(PROBE NUM=1), there is no need for sending announcements (ANNOUNCE NUM=0), and
a host may start using an address after waiting any time longer than the max-
imal communication delay. For a model of this simplified protocol with 3 hosts
Uppaal can verify ME and DE in a few seconds on a standard PC.
4 Verification by Model Checking and Abstraction
Although we have a manual (operational) proof of Theorem 1, we also would like
to have a proof that is obtained in a more automatic and structured way. Model
checking is of course such an automatic way, but it suffers from state space
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explosion. Moreover, model checking can only verify a single instance of the
protocol, whereas we would like to establish correctness for all (infinitely many)
instantiations of its parameters. Abstraction is a remedy to both problems.
The idea is to use an abstraction relation for Uppaal that is sound for the
property to be verified, meaning that when the properties hold in the abstract
model, then it must hold in the concrete models. We need to make abstractions
in a compositional way, which means that in a parallel composition of a set of
timed automata, a subset can be replaced by its abstraction, thereby obtaining
a total model that in turn is an abstraction of the original total model.
Section 4.1 describes the compositional abstraction framework. Section 4.2
introduces some small extra assumptions we need. Section 4.3 gives a finite
abstract model, and Section 4.4 gives a feasible version of this model. Finally
Section 4.5 gives the verification results.
4.1 Compositional Abstraction
The operational semantics of a Uppaal model is defined on the model as a
whole, see the Uppaal help menu or [5]. Instead we need timed transition sys-
tems (TTSs) as semantical model for a single timed automaton, parallel compo-
sition on TTSs, and an abstraction relation for TTSs that is sound for invariant
properties. Details and proofs of this compositional semantics and abstraction
are described in [6].
Jensen, Larsen and Skou [25] present a compositional transition system se-
mantics for Uppaal which handles urgency and (a restricted form of) multi-
writer/multi-reader semantics. However their model does not incorporate com-
mitted locations and their parallel composition operator is not associative [7],
two aspects which are essential for our case study.
Basically, TTSs are labeled transition systems equipped with a bit of addi-
tional structure to support shared variables and committed transitions: states
are defined as valuations of variables, and transitions may be committed, which
gives them a certain priority in a parallel composition. TTSs can be placed in
parallel and may communicate by means of shared variables and synchronization
of actions. Like in CCS [31], two transitions may synchronize when their actions
are complementary, leading to an internal transition in the composition.
We consider three different types of state transitions, corresponding to three
different types of actions. We assume a set C of channels and let c range over C.
The set of external actions is defined as E , {c!, c? | c ∈ C}. Actions of the form
c! are called output actions and actions of the form c? are called input actions.
We assume the existence of a special internal action τ , and write Eτ for E ∪{τ},
the set of discrete actions. Finally, we assume a set of durations or time-passage
actions, which in this paper are just the nonnegative real numbers in R≥0. We
write Act for Eτ ∪ R≥0, the set of actions.
TTSs are capable of communication over a universal set V of typed variables,
with a subset X ⊆ V of clock variables or clocks. Clocks have domain R≥0. A
valuation for a set V ⊆ V is a function that maps each variable in V to an
element in its domain. For valuation v ∈ Val(V ) and duration d ∈ R≥0, we
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define v ⊕ d to be the valuation for V that increments clock variables by d, and
leaves the other variables untouched, that is, for all y ∈ V ,
(v ⊕ d)(y) ,
{
v(y) + d if y ∈ X
v(y) otherwise
We write dom(f) to denote the domain of a function f (in our case a valu-
ation). For functions f and g, we let f  g denote the left-merge, the combined
function where f overrides g for all elements in the intersection of their domains.
Formally, we define f g to be the function with dom(f g) = dom(f)∪dom(g)
satisfying, for all z ∈ dom(f  g),
(f  g)(z) ,
{
f(z) if z ∈ dom(f)
g(z) if z ∈ dom(g)− dom(f)
We define the dual right-merge operator by f g , gf . Two functions f and g
are compatible, notation f♥g, if they agree on the intersection of their domains,
that is, f(z) = g(z) for all z ∈ dom(f)∩dom(g). For compatible functions f and
g, we define their merge by f‖g , f  g. Whenever we write f‖g, we implicitly
assume f♥g. We write f [g] for the update of function f according to g, that is
∀z ∈ dom(f) : f [g](z) = (f  g)(z).
The state variables of a TTS are partitioned into external and internal vari-
ables. Internal variables may only be updated by the TTS itself and not by its
environment. This in contrast to external variables, which may be updated by
both the TTS and its environment. A new element in our definition of a TTS is
that transitions are classified as either committed or uncommitted. Committed
transitions have priority over time-passage transitions and over internal transi-
tions that are not committed. Interestingly, whereas in Uppaal committedness
is an attribute of locations, it must be treated as an attribute of transitions in
order to obtain a compositional semantics.
Definition 1 (TTS). A timed transition system (TTS) is a tuple
T = 〈E,H, S, s0,−→1,−→0〉,
where E,H ⊆ V are disjoint sets of external and internal variables, respectively,
V = E ∪H, S ⊆ Val(V ) is the set of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, and the
transition relations −→1 and −→0 are subsets of S ×Act × S.
We write r
a,b
−−→ s if (r, a, s) ∈−→b. The value b determines whether or not
a transition is committed. We often omit b when it equals 0. A state s is called
committed, notation Comm(s), iff it enables an outgoing committed transition,
that is, s
a,1
−−→ for some a. We require the following axioms to hold, for all s, t ∈ S,
a, a′ ∈ Act, b ∈ B, d ∈ R≥0 and u ∈ Val(E),
s
a,1
−−→ ∧s
a′,b
−−→ ⇒ a′ ∈ E ∨ (a′ = τ ∧ b) (Axiom I)
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s[u] ∈ S (Axiom II)
s
c?,b
−−→ ⇒ s[u]
c?,b
−−→ (Axiom III)
s
d
−→ t ⇒ t = s⊕ d (Axiom IV)
Axiom I states that in a committed state neither time-passage steps nor un-
committed τ ’s may occur. The axiom implies that committed transitions always
have a label in Eτ . Note that a committed state may have outgoing uncommitted
transitions with a label in E . The reason is that, for instance, an uncommitted
c!-transition may synchronize with a committed c?-transition from some other
component, and thereby turn into a committed τ -transition. Axiom II states
that if the external variables of a state are changed, the result is again a state.
Axiom III states that enabledness of input transitions is not affected by changing
the external variables. This is a key property that we need in order to obtain
compositionality. Axiom IV, finally, asserts that if time advances with an amount
d, all clocks also advance with an amount d, and the other variables remain un-
changed.
In our setting parallel composition is a partial operation that is only defined
when TTSs are compatible: the initial states must be compatible functions and
the internal variables of one TTS may not intersect with the variables of the
other.
Definition 2 (Parallel composition). Two TTSs T1 and T2 are compatible if
H1∩V2 = H2∩V1 = ∅ and s
0
1♥s
0
2. In this case, their parallel composition T1‖T2
is the tuple T = 〈E,H, S, s0,−→1,−→0〉, where E = E1 ∪ E2, H = H1 ∪ H2,
S = {r‖s | r ∈ S1 ∧ s ∈ S2 ∧ r♥s}, s
0 = s01‖s
0
2, and −→
1 and −→0 are the least
relations that satisfy the rules in Fig. 9. Here i, j range over {1, 2}, r, r′ range
over Si, s, s
′ range over Sj, b, b
′ range over B, e ranges over E and c over C.
The external and internal variables of the composition are simply obtained
by taking the union of the external and internal variables of the components,
respectively. The states (and start state) of a composed TTS are obtained by
merging the states (resp. start state) of the components. The interesting part
of the definition consists of the rules in Figure 9. Rule EXT states that an
external transition of a component induces a corresponding transition of the
composition. The component that takes the transition may override some of
the shared variables. Similarly, rule TAU states that an internal transition of a
component induces a corresponding transition of the composition, except that
an uncommitted transition may only occur if the other component is in an
uncommitted state. Rule SYNC describes the synchronization of components.
If Ti has an output transition from r to r
′, and if Tj has a corresponding input
transition from s, updated by r′, to s′, the composition has a τ transition to
r′  s′. The synchronization is committed iff one of the participating transitions
is committed. However, an uncommitted synchronization may only occur if both
components are in an uncommitted state. Rule TIME, finally, states that a time
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r
e,b
−−→i r
′
r‖s
e,b
−−→ r′  s
EXT
r
τ,b
−−→i r
′ Comm(s) ⇒ b
r‖s
τ,b
−−→ r′  s
TAU
r
c!,b
−−→i r
′ s[r′]
c?,b′
−−−→j s
′ i 6= j
Comm(r) ∨ Comm(s) ⇒ b ∨ b′
r‖s
τ,b∨b′
−−−−→ r′  s′
SYNC
r
d
−→i r
′ s
d
−→j s
′ i 6= j
r‖s
d
−→ r′‖s′
TIME
Fig. 9. Rules for parallel composition of TTSs
step d of the composition may occur when both components perform a time step
d.
We refer to [6] for a proof that the composition of two TTSs is indeed a
TTS. An important sanity check for our definitions is that parallel composition
is both commutative and associative. Commmutativity immediately follows from
the definitions. For a proof of associativity we refer to [6].
Uppaal models can be mapped to TTSs in a straightforward manner [6].
Each variable in a Uppaal model corresponds to a variable in a TTS. We treat
each element in a Uppaal array as a distinct variable. For each timed automa-
ton A we introduce a special variable A.loc to record the current location of
this automaton. The location and local variables of an automaton A are always
classified as internal. If v is a local variable of automaton A then A.v becomes an
internal variable of the TTS associated to A. Each global variable in a Uppaal
model becomes an element of the external variables of all automata. A discrete
transition is committed if and only if it starts from a state with a committed
location.
For the axioms of a TTS to hold we need timed automata to comply with
the following rules as defined in [6]:
– A location invariant does not depend on the external variables.
– Satisfaction of guards on input transitions does not depend on the external
variables.
– In a committed location always at least one edge is enabled.
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– Urgent edges do not synchronize, and their guards do not depend on the
values of clocks.
In the Zeroconf model it is easy to see that all of the rules hold. The urgent
action urg! can be viewed as an urgent internal action. Because urg? does not
exist this broadcast synchronization will only involve a single automaton.
Given a timed automaton A, we write TTS(A) to denote its TTS semantics.
The semantics of a complete Uppaal model A1, . . . , An is obtained by associat-
ing a TTS to each individual automaton in the model, taking the composition
of all these TTSs, and then removing all synchronization transitions from the
resulting TTS (cf. the restriction operator in CCS [31]):
(TTS(A1)‖ · · · ‖TTS(An))\E .
We claim that, modulo the “committed” Booleans, the resulting TTS is equal
to the semantics for Uppaal models as defined in [5]. For a proof we refer to [6].
Abstractions on TTSs are defined by timed step simulation, which is a relation
on the states of the TTSs. Timed step simulation requires that both TTSs have
the same external variables. The initial states are related. Related states have
the same values for external variables, and if these values are changed by the
environment two states are obtained that again are related. If an abstract state
is committed, than so is every related concrete state. Each transition in the
concrete TTS is mimicked by a transition between related states in the abstract
TTS, except τ , which may be simulated by “doing nothing”.
Definition 3 (Timed step simulation). Two TTSs T1 and T2 are compara-
ble if they have the same external variables, that is E1 = E2. Given comparable
TTSs T1 and T2, we say that a relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 is a timed step simulation
from T1 to T2, provided that s
0
1 R s
0
2 and if sR r then
1. ∀y ∈ E1 : s(y) = r(y),
2. ∀u ∈ Val(E1) : s[u] R r[u],
3. if Comm(r) then Comm(s),
4. if s
a,b
−−→ s′ then either there exists an r′ such that r
a,b
−−→ r′ and s′ R r′, or
a = τ and s′ R r.
We write T1  T2 when there exists a timed step simulation from T1 to T2.
The following two theorems play a key role in our verification. Theorem 2
states that invariants for an abstract system are also invariants for a related
concrete system, Theorem 3 establishes that timed step simulations are compo-
sitional.
Theorem 2. Let T1 and T2 be comparable timed transition systems such that
T1  T2. Let φ be an invariant over the external variables of T1 (and T2), then
φ holds in T2 ⇒ φ holds in T1
Theorem 3. Let T1, T2, T3 be timed transition systems such that T1 and T2 are
comparable, and both T1 and T2 are compatible with T3. If T1  T2 then T1‖T3 
T2‖T3.
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4.2 Model without Network Addresses
Before we can make a finite abstraction of our model, we need some other ab-
stractions and some minor changes to the original model.
A new assumption that we need is that after reset[j] in automaton Config
at least 1 second is spent in location INIT. We model this by adding the conjunct
x ≥ 1 on the guard of the edge from INIT to WAIT. To keep the same behavior
for the initial state of the model, we add an initial committed location to Config
that has an edge to INIT which updates x to 1. Note that our new initial state
differs in clock x from the original one, but this has no influence on behavior: an
arbitrary amount of time may elapse in INIT, the transition to WAIT is enabled
on the same conditions, and x is reset anyway. Figure 10 shows the changed part
of Config.
WAIT
x<=PROBE_WAIT
INIT
x:=1
guess:IPtype
guess!=zero
&& x>=1
IP[pid]:=guess,
x:=0
Fig. 10. Changed part of Config.
Using our new assumption we will show that we only have to prove a variant
of the model where every host is associated with one specific Network automa-
ton. The following argumentation can be formalized straightforward in terms of
strong bisimularity of the underlying transition systems. The model contains n
Network automata that together model the complete network. Everytime a host
wants to send a message, one automaton Network is used. For reasons of symme-
try, it does not matter which of the n automata is chosen. Suppose some host
has sent a message using Network automaton A. Our new assumption makes sure
that after resetting the host, a new message will only be sent after more than
1 second of delay has elapsed. At that point, A will surely be finished, and it
is back in its IDLE location. Therefore automaton A may again be used for the
next message that is sent.
We conclude that we can associate one Network automaton to each host that
only serves that specific host. The new model is obtained from the old definition
by replacing Networktype everywhere by PIDtype. To make sure Network only
serves a designated host, we parametrize channel send req with PIDtype. Given
some PID h ∈ PIDtype automata Config(h) and Network(h) will synchronize on
send req[h].
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The model for a single host is described by:
H(h) = Config(h)‖InputHandler(h)‖Regular(h)‖Network(h)
, where h ∈ PIDtype.
The total model becomes:
H(h1)‖ · · · ‖H(hk)‖Initializer
, where we have k PIDs h1, . . . , hk ∈ PIDtype.
We will leave out Initializer as it is only used to give a number of global
scalarsets their initial values, as Uppaal does not support initialization of sca-
larsets.
4.3 A Finite Model Checking Problem
Here we construct a finite model checking problem, using a so called chaos au-
tomaton. In theory this model is decidable, however in the next sections we will
introduce some more abstractions to make model checking tractable.
Because PIDs are modeled by the scalarset PIDtype, our mutual exclusion
property holds if and only if the property below holds. Thus, we need to prove
mutual exclusion only for two hosts:
A[] (UseIP[h1] && UseIP[h2]) imply IP[h1]!=IP[h2]
We will build a so called chaos automaton Chaos1 that is an abstraction for
hosts H(h3), . . . , H(hk) in parallel, i.e., it is able to simulate all behavior of these
hosts in parallel as observable by the environment.
From the automata we see that in synchronization between H(h1), . . . , H(hk),
only channels receive msg and send answer play a role. Channels reset and
send req are only used within a single host.
Now Chaos1 is the automaton able to do the following actions in arbitrary
order and with arbitrary timing, where s, r will denote sender, receiver side
of a synchronzation respectively. Note that variable packet is only used for
value passing during synchronization, and therefore only needs to be set on the
corresponding actions.
– receive msg[s][r]? with arbitrary s ∈ PIDtype and r ∈ {h3 . . . , hk},
– send answer[r]! for r ∈ {h1, h2} setting packet to an arbitrary value,
– receive msg[s][r]! for s ∈ {h3, . . . , hk}, arbitrary r ∈ PIDtype, and setting
packet to an arbitrary value,
– send answer[r]? for r ∈ {h3, . . . , hk},
– we do not need an internal (non-synchronizing) action setting packet to an
arbitrary value, because packet is only used to pass a packet on synchroniza-
tion.
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Chaos1 is shown in figure 11. The array of Booleans isConcretePID is used to
decide whether a PID is h1 or h2, in which case it denotes a concrete host. PIDs
h3, . . . , hk denote a host abstracted by Chaos1. Array isConcretePID is initialized
by the Initializer automaton. PIDtype is used as parameter of hosts H. Uppaal
generates an automaton for every value of PIDtype. Therefore, to make sure we
only have hosts for h1 and h2, we strengthen the guard on the first edges of
Config, InputHandler, and Regular to check whether they are initialized with
h1 or h2. The strengthened guards make sure that in the cases h3, . . . , hk, the
automata cannot take any edges, and therefore do not play a role in the total
system.
r:PIDtype,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
receive_msg[s][r]?
r:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
send_answer[r]?r:PIDtype,
ha:HAtype,
ip1:IPtype,
ip2:IPtype,
b:BOOL
isConcretePID[r]
send_answer[r]!
packet.senderHA:=ha,
packet.senderIP:=ip1,
packet.targetIP:=ip2,
packet.request:=b
r:PIDtype,
ha:HAtype,
ip1:IPtype,
ip2:IPtype,
b:BOOL,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[s]
receive_msg[s][r]!
packet.senderHA:=ha,
packet.senderIP:=ip1,
packet.targetIP:=ip2,
packet.request:=b
Fig. 11. Chaos1
It is clear from the model that messages to h3, . . . , hk will be caught by
Chaos1, i.e., actions receive msg[s][r]!, where r ∈ {h3, . . . , hk} are only possible
in Chaos1. Moreover Chaos1 doesn’t place any constraints on synchronization,
and the synchronization does not affect the behavior of Chaos1. We conclude
that the actions can be left out. A very easy way to obtain this is by altering the
set function in Network. We let it only set the elements to true that correspond
to the concrete PIDs h1 and h2. In this way elements of send and answer that
correspond to h3, . . . , hk are simply never changed.
Theorem 4 (Correctness of the Abstraction). The mutual exclusion prop-
erty for the original model holds, when it holds in:
H(h1)‖H(h2)‖Chaos1
Proof. We have:
Chaos1  H(h3)‖ · · · ‖H(hk)
By applying Theorem 3 we get:
H(h1)‖H(h2)‖Chaos1  H(h1)‖ · · · ‖H(hk)
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The mutual exclusion property is an invariant statement in terms of external
variables. From Theorem 2 we conclude that we can model check mutual exclu-
sion on H(h1)‖H(h2)‖Chaos1, and when mutual exclusion holds it will also hold
in the original model. QED
4.4 Making Model Checking feasible
Here we will introduce some more abstractions to make the model checking
problem tracktable.
Abstraction for Network Action send answer[j]! with update packet := p,
where j ∈ Networktype and p ∈ ARP packet, is possible in InputHandler and
Chaos1. We want to be able to distinguish whether the answer was generated by
one of the two concrete hosts or Chaos1. Therefore we add a parameter to the
channel such that it becomes send answer[j][h]!, where h ∈ PIDtype.
Action send answer[·]? was only used in Network(h1), Network(h2), and Chaos1
on a single transition. The transition needs to be replaced by multiple transi-
tions, where each transition does exactly the same as the original transition,
but synchronizes on a different PID. This is easily accommodated by using the
Uppaal select statement h:PIDtype. For Chaos1 these changes lead to Chaos2, as
shown in Fig. 12.
r:PIDtype,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
receive_msg[s][r]?
from:PIDtype,
r:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
send_answer[r][from]?
from:PIDtype,
r:PIDtype,
ha:HAtype,
ip1:IPtype,
ip2:IPtype,
b:BOOL
isConcretePID[r]
send_answer[r][from]!
packet.senderHA:=ha,
packet.senderIP:=ip1,
packet.targetIP:=ip2,
packet.request:=b
r:PIDtype,
ha:HAtype,
ip1:IPtype,
ip2:IPtype,
b:BOOL,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[s]
receive_msg[s][r]!
packet.senderHA:=ha,
packet.senderIP:=ip1,
packet.targetIP:=ip2,
packet.request:=b
Fig. 12. Chaos2
We continue by strengthening the guard on receiving answers in Network such
that it will only receive answers from concrete hosts H(h1) and H(h2). This is
easily accomodated by isConcretePID. The result is given by NetConcrAns, as
shown in Fig. 13.
Automaton AbsAns will handle the answers from chaos automaton Chaos2.
AbsAns itself is also a chaos automaton, as it can do actions in any order and on
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BUSY
IDLE
from:PIDtype
isConcretePID(from) &&
a_buffer.senderIP==zero
send_answer[j][from]?
a_buffer:=packet,
set(answer)
a:PIDtype
answer[a]==true
receive_msg[j][a]!
answer[a]:=false,
packet:=a_buffer
a:PIDtype
send[a]==true
receive_msg[j][a]!
send[a]:=false,
packet:=s_buffer
forall (a:PIDtype) !send[a] && !answer[a]
urg!
initialize(s_buffer),
initialize(a_buffer)
isConcreteNet(j)
send_req?
s_buffer:=packet,
set(send),
z:=0
Fig. 13. Timed automaton NetConcrAns(j)
any time. Figure 14 shows the Uppaal timed automaton we can use for AbsAns(j).
to:PIDtype
receive_msg[j][to]!
from:PIDtype
!isConcretePID(from)
send_answer[j][from]?
Fig. 14. Timed automaton AbsAns(j)
The next lemma formally states our new abstraction. Most recently, efficient
on-line algorithms for solving reachability and safety games based on timed game
automata have been put forward [12] and made available within Uppaal-Tiga.
In collaboration with Thomas Chatain, Alexandre David and Kim Larsen, we
have been able to use Uppaal-Tiga to automatically check the timed step
simulation.
Lemma 1. For arbitrary j ∈ Networktype:
NetConcrAns(j)‖AbsAns(j)  Network(j).
In Chaos2 we have actions of the form: send answer[j][h]!, such that h ∈
{h3, . . . , hk}. AbsAns(h1) and AbsAns(h2) are the only automata that can syn-
chronize on these actions. As these synchronizations do not change the system
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state we may as well delete all participating edges, both sending and receiving
actions. For Fig. 14 this means the upper arc is removed. For Chaos2 in Fig. 12
this means the arc on the left is removed. The resulting automaton Chaos3 is the
final one used for verification and is shown in Fig. 15. Action send answer[j][h]?,
which is only present in NetConcrAns, will only be parametrized with h = h1 or
h = h2. Moreover, if send answer[j][h1]? is possible, send answer[j][h2]? is also
possible and vice versa. We may as well return to our original situation where
send answer only has the first parameter, thus we may as well use again Network
instead of NetConcrAns. We can easily see that:
Chaos3  AbsAns(h1)‖AbsAns(h2).
Therefore we can as well leave out AbsAns(h1) and AbsAns(h2) in our abstract
system. Recapitulating, the total model becomes:
H(h1)‖H(h2)‖Chaos3,
where the only thing that has changed with respect to the previous model is
Chaos3, which has no actions send answer[·][·]!.
r:PIDtype,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
receive_msg[s][r]?
r:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[r]
send_answer[r]?
r:PIDtype,
ha:HAtype,
ip1:IPtype,
ip2:IPtype,
b:BOOL,
s:PIDtype
!isConcretePID[s]
receive_msg[s][r]!
packet.senderHA:=ha,
packet.senderIP:=ip1,
packet.targetIP:=ip2,
packet.request:=b
Fig. 15. Chaos3
Overapproximation By weakening guards, weakening invariants, or by mak-
ing an urgent channel non-urgent, we add behavior to an automaton. The old
behavior with the same values for the variables is still present. Adding more
behavior to some automaton A using these methods will give an automaton
B which simulates A, thus B  A, according to Definition 3 (timed step sim-
ulation.) Using Theorem 2, if we manage to prove an invariant for the larger
(“overapproximated”) automaton B it will certainly hold for the smaller, origi-
nal automaton A. As timed step simulation is compositional (Th. 3), weakening
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one automaton of the model will give a total model that is an overapproximation
of the original.
If, as a result of weakening, a variable is tested in none of the transitions and
it is also not read by the context, it can be safely omitted from the model, which
can again be characterized by timed step simulation. A variable is read by the
context if it occurs in the property we are trying to prove, or is used by another
automaton. In the case of Zeroconf, overapproximation and subsequent variable
elimination can be applied in the following two situations:
1. We may weaken the guards of the two transitions from COLLISION to INIT
in Config(j) to true, and remove the transition label urg!. In the resulting
model local variable ConflictNum is no longer used and so we can eliminate
it.
2. We may weaken the guard of the left receive msg[j]? transition in automa-
ton InputHandler(j) to true. In the resulting model local clock y is no longer
used and it can eliminate it.
The basic idea behind abstractions (1) and (2) is that Zeroconf ensures mutual
exclusion even when a host is allowed to always immediately select a new IP
address after a reset, and may always defend the IP address that it is using.
We continue to apply yet another technique. The final automata for Config and
InputHandler are shown in Figures. 16 and 17.
Dead Variable Reduction Dead variable reduction is a well known static
analysis technique, that has for instance been studied in the PhD thesis of Yorav
[36]. In Yorav’s terminology, a variable v is used in a transition if it appears in
the guard or in the right hand side of an assignment. A variable is used in a
location if it appears in the invariant of that location. Variable v is defined in
a transition if it is in the left hand side of an assignment. Notice that in an
assignment v := v + 1, v is first used, and then it is defined. A variable v is said
to be dead at a location l if on every execution path from l, v is defined before
it is used, or is never used at all.
Clearly, automata that only differ in the values of dead variables are equiva-
lent in a very strong sense, i.e., they are strongly bisimilar, which in turn implies
they simulate each other via timed step simulation. Setting variables as soon as
they become dead to some default value will in general reduce the state space,
because states that only differ in their dead variables will now become exactly
the same.
In our Zeroconf model, variable counter of Config(j) is dead in locations
COLLISSION and INIT. Hence, setting counter:=0 upon occurrence of a reset tran-
sition will not affect whether the ME property holds or not. Another example is
the variable network, which is dead in location IDLE of InputHandler(j), and can
be reset to a standard value. To have a standard value available we have defined
global constant Networktype net0.
Only one InputHandler automaton Consider automaton InputHandler. The
transition from IDLE to BUSY is never performed from a system state that is
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committed. Therefore at most one automaton will be in location BUSY. Thus we
may as well use only one automaton in our model. But InputHandler needs to
know the PID of the host it is working for. This PID can be derived in the first
transition and stored in a local variable.
The final abstract model We conclude this section by the final abstract
model for the Zeroconf Protocol, and the verification results. With respect to
the concrete model, timed automata Regular and Initializer have not changed.
Figures 16 and 17 show the new versions of Uppaal timed automata.
PRE_CLAIM
x<=ANNOUNCE_WAITWAIT
x<=PROBE_WAIT
PROBE
x <= PROBE_MAX
INIT
CLAIMED
counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM
imply
x<=ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
isConcretePID[pid]
x:=1
reset[pid]?
UseIP[pid]:=false,
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0,
counter:=0
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0
counter==PROBE_NUM
urg!
x:=0, counter:=0x:=PROBE_MAX
reset[pid]?
IP[pid]:=zero,
x:=0,
counter:=0
counter<PROBE_NUM &&
x>=PROBE_MIN
send_req[pid]!
packet.senderHA:=HA[pid],
packet.senderIP:=zero,
packet.targetIP:=IP[pid],
packet.request:=true,
counter++,
x:=0
guess:IPtype
guess!=zero
&& x>=1
IP[pid]:=guess,
x:=0
counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM &&
x== ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
send_req[pid]!
packet.senderHA:=HA[pid],
packet.senderIP:=IP[pid],
packet.targetIP:=IP[pid],
packet.request:=true,
counter++,
x:=0,
UseIP[pid]:=true
x==ANNOUNCE_WAIT
x:=ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
Fig. 16. Final abstract timed automaton Config(h)
4.5 Verification Results
We have been able to establish mutual exclusion for a system with an arbitrary
number of hosts, hardware addresses, and IP addresses. We managed to check
ME for for an arbitrary number of hosts, due to the assumption that hosts are
idle for at least 1 second after a reset, and due to our abstraction of hosts by one
chaos automaton. We managed to check ME for an arbitrary number of PIDs,
hardware addresses, and IP addresses, due to a theorem of Ip and Dill [24] on
data saturation. This theorem (which was proved in the setting of Murphi but
can easily be shown to carry over to Uppaal) states that for certain (“data”)
scalarsets, the state graph does not grow any further once the size of some
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BUSY
INIT IDLE
answer.senderIP==zero
&& do_reset
reset[pid]!
do_reset:=false
answer.senderIP!=zero
send_answer[network]!
packet:=answer,
initialize(answer)
answer.senderIP==zero
&& !do_reset
j:Networktype
receive_msg[j][pid]?
ihandler(false),
network:=j
y:=DEFEND_INTERVAL+1,
initialize(answer) j:Networktype
y>DEFEND_INTERVAL
receive_msg[j][pid]?
ihandler(true),
network:=j
Fig. 17. Final abstract timed automaton InputHandler(h)
scalarset grows beyond the number of places in the system where that scalarset
is used. This makes model checking with scalarsets of arbitrary size possible.
In our case, at the global level, we need 2 PIDs because we need to have
two hosts for our abstract model to work. Furthermore, a select statement has
the ability to choose a PID different from these two, which makes a difference
for exectution, and therfore we need a total of at most 3 PIDs. PIDs are also
used as index of the arrays sent and replied but as discussed only the elements
in sent and replied that correspond to the concrete hosts are changed. Having
more than two PIDs will not have an impact on the possible values for sent and
replied.
For hardware addresses, at the global level there are:
– 2 hardware addresses in use in array HA (one per host).
– 1 hardware address is in use by nil.
– 1 hardware address is in use by InputHandler
– 2 by Network since packets use one hardware address.
As there are 2 Network automata, we get a total of 8 scalarset locations for
hardware addresses. Furthermore, a select statement has the ability to choose a
hardware address different from the others, which makes a difference for exectu-
tion, and therefore we need a total of at most 9 hardware addresses.
For IP addresses, at the global level there are:
– 2 IP addresses are in use in array IP.
– 1 hardware address is in use as zero.
– 2 IP addresses are in use by InputHandler in packet answer.
– 4 IP addresses are in use by Network, namely 2 in each of the two packets.
As there are 2 Network automata, the total model has 13 scalarset locations for
IP addresses. Furthermore, a select statement has the ability to choose an IP
address different from the others, which makes a difference for exectution, and
therefore we need a total of at most 14 IP addresses.
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Summarizing, all instances of the model consist of all possible combinations
of k ∈ {1, . . . , 3} PIDs, l ∈ {1, . . . , 9} hardware addresses, and m ∈ {1, . . . , 14}
IP addresses. Model checking all instances took approximately 75 hours on the
following hardware: 2 x Dual-Core Opteron 280 2.4 GHz, 8 GB RAM. Note that
we used 4 processing cores to work parallel on different instances. The biggest
instance (k = 3, l = 9,m = 14) uses 692739 symbolic states.
5 Conclusions
Our goal has been to construct a model of Zeroconf that (a) is easy to understand
by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to RFC 3927, and (c) may serve as
a basis for formal verification. Did we succeed?
Understandability Of course, it is not to us to judge whether our model is un-
derstandable for others. The present paper aims to place the cards on the table
as a basis for a discussion. The Uppaal syntax, which combines extended finite
state machines, C-like syntax and concepts from timed automata, will certainly
be familiar to protocol engineers, except maybe for the use of clock variables.
However, our experience is that timed automata notation is easy to explain, also
to people without expertise in theoretical computer science. Clocks provide a
simple and intuitive means to specify the various timing constraints in Zeroconf.
There are a number of extensions of the Uppaal syntax that would help to
further improve the readability of our model:
1. A richer syntax for datatypes and functions, for instance permitting us to
write 0.0.0.0 for the all zero IP address instead of 0.
2. The ability to initialize clock and structure variables, allowing us to eliminate
the initial transition in the InputHandler[pid] automaton.
3. The ability to test the value of clocks within the body of functions, allowing
us to move the test y>DEFEND interval into the definition of ihandler, where
it belongs conceptually.
4. The introduction of urgent transitions in Uppaal, as advocated in [20]. This
would allow us to eliminate the urgent channel urg, which is a modeling
trick that is hard to explain to non-specialists. Also, it would allow us to
replace the invariant counter < ANNOUNCE NUM imply x <= ANNOUNCE INTERVAL
in automaton Config by an urgency predicate x <= ANNOUNCE INTERVAL. In
our opinion, urgency predicates are more intuitive than location invariants.
Once these extensions have been implemented, a good case can be made for
inclusion of the Config and InputHandler automata (with the ihandler code) in
the Zeroconf standard. These models will help to clarify the RFC and to prevent
incorrect interpretations due to ambiguity in the text. The Uppaal simulator is
also very useful to obtain insight in the operation of the protocol.
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Faithfulness and Traceability We have shown that Uppaal is able to model Ze-
roconf faithfully. Basically, for each transition in the model we can point towards
a corresponding piece of text in the RFC. The relationships between our model
and the RFC have been described in great detail in this paper, including the
design choices and abstractions that we made. Following [10], our aim has been
to make the model construction transparent, so that our model may be more
easily understood and checked by others, making its quality measurable in (at
least) an informal sense.
We see at least two ways in which Uppaal can be improved to allow for even
more faithful/realistic modeling of Zeroconf and better traceability:
– Zeroconf involves a number of probabilistic aspects that are not incorporated
in our Uppaal model. An extension with probabilities, along the lines of
PRISM [27], is clearly desirable.
– Uppaal supports modeling of systems that are described as networks of a
fixed number of automata with a fixed communication structure. This mod-
eling approach, although very convenient as a starting point for verification,
does not fit very well with the highly dynamic structure of Zeroconf networks
where hosts may join and leave, subnetworks may be joined, etc. Support
for a more object-oriented specification style appears to be desirable.
Verification Our modeling efforts revealed five places where RFC 3927 [15] is
incomplete/unclear:
1. It does not specify upper and lower bounds on the time that may elapse
between sending the last ARP Probe and sending the first ARP Announce-
ment.
2. It does not specify whether a host may immediately start using a newly
claimed address or whether it should first send out all ARP Announcements.
3. It does not specify the tolerance that is permitted on the timing of ARP
Announcements.
4. Although it states that Zeroconf requires an underlying network that sup-
ports ARP (RFC 826), we identified some cases where Zeroconf does not
conform to RFC 826.
5. It is not exactly clear in which situations a host may defend its address.
The model of Zeroconf that we presented in Section 2 cannot be analyzed by
Uppaal for interesting instances with 3 or more hosts. We presented a simple
manual proof of mutual exclusion for the model of Section 2. In order to verify
the general system automatically, we had to apply some drastic abstractions. The
soundness of these abstractions has been proven manually and using Uppaal-
Tiga. In our view, it is highly desirable to further extend Uppaal with (semi-
)automatic support for proving correctness of abstractions. Only abstractions
can bridge the gap between realistic and tractable models.
Future Work In this study, we have only modeled/analyzed a fragment of Ze-
roconf in a restrictive setting without faulty nodes, merging of subnetworks,
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etc. In order to deal with dynamically changing network topologies, a more so-
phisticated use of abstractions will be required, for instance along the lines of
[3]. An obvious challenge is to mechanize all these abstractions using either (an
extension of) Uppaal-Tiga or a general purpose theorem prover. The timing
behavior of Zeroconf becomes really interesting when studied within a setting
in which also the probabilistic behavior is modeled. The performance analysis
of Zeroconf reported in [9, 26] has been carried out for an abstract probabilistic
model of Zeroconf. A challenging question is whether these results also hold for
a (probabilistic extension) of our more realistic model.
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